At the beginning of 2009, with Obama’s arrival in the presidency of the United States and his opening towards Iran, the chances of an American military attack against the Islamic Republic with the aim of forcing it to more mild advice dropped drastically. and the abandonment of nuclear power. George W. Bush’s administration knew and feared the consequences of a war against Iran, but had not given up on the threats and had not given up on developing various attack plans, periodically updating them in a blatant way and using them as pressure. psychology on leadership Iranian. Even more decisive seemed Israel, which, with Bush’s implicit consent, showed the same intention and tried to convince the American ally of the inevitability of such a solution, exaggerating the dangerousness of the activities in Iran’s nuclear sites and the approach of the date of manufacture of the ayatollahs’ atomic bomb. Obama revises Bush’s strategy, but in the meantime a right-wing government is established in Israel chaired by Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, with the ultra-conservative Avigdor Lieberman at the head of diplomacy. On Monday 18 May Netanyahu meets Obama in the White House and in the talks between the two substantial dissent emerges on the tactics to be adopted towards Iran. But the Israeli premier still manages to get a certain date to assess Tehran’s true intentions: December 2009. After this deadline, if Iran remains on its positions and does not freeze nuclear plans, America will review the strategy based on negotiation dialogue and Israel will feel freer to make autonomous decisions to remove the dangers emanating from the Republic Islamic. But we are almost a month away from the presidential elections in Iran and no one, not even Netanyahu, can foresee the serious political crisis that such elections will provoke. Meanwhile, the Israeli government, not too discreetly, cheers for Ahmadinejad, hoping for a victory for the regime’s extremists, notoriously hostile to any dialogue with the United States. Netanyahu in fact prefers the reconfirmation of a hawk in Tehran and hopes that the prospects of the US-Iran dialogue will be blocked. Thus, the military option against Iran begins to take hold again with the Israeli government. The threats of military blitzes to destroy Iranian nuclear sites are then reinforced by the observation of a weakening of Iranian positions in the international community due to the brutality of the ongoing repression and the violent litigation that characterizes the political life of the Iranian regime. The deep fracture at the vertex increases its vulnerability and consequently leaves room for the thought that a single blow would be enough to destroy it. In short, the same temptation that in 1980 led Saddam Hussein to invade Iran is growing, with the conviction that revolutionary chaos, the disintegration of the armed forces and the isolation of Khomeinism following the taking of hostages in the US embassy in Tehran would have facilitated the task of bringing the Islamic Republic to its knees in a short time. Those calculations of Saddam, of which almost all Western countries had also been convinced, were completely wrong and the devastating Iran-Iraq war lasted eight years thanks above all to the nationalistic pride of the Iranians who mobilized en masse to defend the country.
According to directoryaah, the Iran of 2009 is, however, very different from that of 1980. It has a well-organized army and formidable weapons capable of destabilizing and inflaming the entire region.
considering the invasion of portions of Iranian territory using ground troops. The war plans against Iran foresee deep air strikes against strategic targets, such as military and nuclear sites, the Pasdaran barracks, oil installations and government buildings, in order to quickly break the resistance and force the regime to capitulation, perhaps with the help of the uprising of the popular masses on the spot. A scenario vaguely similar to what was designed in the first phase for the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. But this is a purely theoretical perspective, if not political fiction, of which the same Americans are aware who on several occasions have made it known to Israel that they do not count on the support of the United States in the event of a war against Iran, even if Washington he declares that Israel “is a sovereign country and can decide how best to ensure its own security”. Obama’s America is persuaded of the adventurous nature of a possible war against Iran, but at the same time it provides a protective umbrella to the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf and helps Israel to strengthen its defense. At the root of the concerns in the US administration are constant pressures from Sunni Arab countries that fear a hegemonic Islamic Republic in the Persian Gulf and Middle East region. Indeed, it is not only Israel that sees Iran as an insidious enemy, but also Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and several other Arab Gulf countries warn that the growth of Iran’s strategic weight in the region poses a serious threat. for the precarious balance of the area. The prospect of dialogue between the United States and Iran is also viewed with concern by these countries, fearful that the rapprochement between Washington and Tehran could overturn the geopolitical and geostrategic relations hitherto based on the alliance of pro-American Arabs and on isolation. of the Islamic Republic. From this point of view, Ahmadinejad’s four years of presidency have been years of great anxiety in most Arab capitals, particularly in those where the Sunni majority is in power, such as in Saudi Arabia. The presence of a Shiite majority in Iraq, traditionally close to the Iranian Shiite theocracy, but also the close relations of friendship and mutual aid between Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah, have raised the fear that the Iranian leadership is maturing the ambition of a sort of Shiite International to be included in the Islamic world from hegemonic positions. The Lebanese Hezbollah war against Israel in July and August 2006 convinced not only Israel, but also Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, that the Islamic Republic is now able to virtually reach the Israeli and Arab borders through the Lebanese Shiite militias. The only Arab country that has always been allied with Iran, since the days of the Iraqi war against Iran, is Syria, but the Tehran-Damascus axis is also perceived as an extension of Iranian hegemony in the Middle East.
