Finance. – The trend of the gross national product, in the last fifteen years, has marked an average growth rate of + 10%, while consumer prices, from 1960 to 1970, have increased by 18%, and from 1970 to 1975 they rose by 56.9%; wholesale prices showed the same trend. The cost of living in recent years has increased by 14.1% for 1974, by 13.1% in 1975 and by 11% in 1976. The balance of payments, active until 1964, has become passive since 1965 to 1972; it broke even in 1973, thus marking a very strong surplus in 1974 (1352 million dollars). The aid granted by Iran developing countries are very difficult to calculate, as the actual payments and commitments for the future are added to the data. The figures available are 135 billion in multilateral aid, 256 billion in aid within the framework of the OPEC countries, 513 billion destined for commitments for the future. The national currency, the rial, was worth 8.58 lire in 1973, 9.45 in 1974 and 10.03 in 1975.
History. – The last fifteen years of the history of the Iran they are characterized by an attempt to pursue a basically nationalistic policy, but without entering into conflict with the powers of the Western bloc. This also occurs in the delicate problem of oil; after the sensationally nationalistic action of Mosaddeq, the current shah avoids entering, like Algeria and Irāq, in contrast to the trusts international. In 1960, the establishment of OPEC (Association of Oil Producers) which includes the most important producers in the world, including of course Iran. On March 20, 1972, the NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company) took over the direct management of basins and plants, management that was previously in the hands of a consortium of British, French, American and Dutch companies which since 1954 replaced the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co On May 24 of the same year there is the Teherān agreement on oil, between the Iran and large international companies. The royalties are primarily used for the industrialization of the country.
According to a2zdirectory, from the point of view of international politics, the current Shah Mohammad Reżā, who showed, after the first hesitations of the 1940s and 1950s, an ever-increasing energy and has de facto control of all spheres of activity in the country, it tends to maintain good relations with everyone, including China and the USSR, but declares its adherence to the American-style world blockade. Relations with the leftist regime of Irāq were bad, also for border issues, and the intervention of well-armed Persian troops in Oman against the Dhofar revolutionaries, starting from 1974, is also significant. United have provided Iran those that can be considered the best weapons in the entire Middle East area (excluding Israel).
In addition to discussions on Persian sovereignty over certain islands of the Persian Gulf (or Arabian Gulf as the Arabs prefer to call it) with relative occupation, on December 2, 1971, by the Iran of some islets in the Gulf itself, the Iran for several years he supported the Kurdish independence movement in ‘Irāq, headed by the shaikh al-Barzānī; in fact the Kurds, of Aryan lineage and language, are considered “Iranian”. However, on March 6, 1975, a reconciliation between Iran and ‘Irāq liquidates the Kurdish problem and Iran withdraws its support from the Kurds of Irāq. Moreover, even within the Iran, the government’s policy is not too tender towards minorities (especially Kurds in fact, and Turks from Azerbaijan, where the population, of about 3 million people, is Turkish-speaking. of the Persian language is absolute, there is no print in Azerbaijani Azerbaijani Turkish, etc.).
The cultural policy of the current shah follows the by now traditional lines of the Pahlavi dynasty: re-evaluation of the ancient pre-Islamic past, especially Achaemenid (the very sumptuous ceremonies, which were attended by heads of state and representatives of governments from all over the world, including the socialist ones, date back to 1971 , of the 25th centenary of the foundation of the empire of Cyrus the Great); relatively little importance given to the Islamic cultural past, also to break the resistance of a certain conservative Muslim fundamentalism which, paradoxically, is sometimes allied to the left-wing opposition (in 1976 the dating from the ègira was even abolished, i.e. from the emigration of Mohammed from Mecca to Medina, and the beginning of the dates was traced back to the establishment of the empire of Cyrus the Great, so that, at the time of the Persian New Year of 21 March 1976, not the solar year 1355 but 2355 began); promotion of literacy (in some cases military service can be replaced by a literacy service, in the so-called sep ā h – ed ā nesh, “army of knowledge”); promotion of the press; founding of new universities, etc.
But these measures did not quell the anti-government agitation of the student intelligentsia, nor did they succeed in propitiating the favor of the people. The repression became increasingly harsh, starting from 1973, and the concessions made to the working masses, such as providing for a kind of profit-sharing by companies, could be of no avail (autumn 1974). The lack of political freedom became even more absolute with the establishment of the one-party regime (1975) and the suppression of the opposition one. In August 1978 a violent revolt broke out, which found the elements of Islamic orthodoxy (led by the religious leader in exile, Ayatollah Khomeini) and left-wing parties joined together. The Sh ā h he attempted to stem the insurrection by calling a moderate, Bakhtiar, to the government, but in the face of the unstoppable progress of the revolution, Rezā Pahlavī was forced to leave in exile (January 16, 1979). On February 10 Khomeini returned to his homeland, appointing a new prime minister, Bazargan, and establishing (February 12) the Islamic Republic. See Table. ft
